

New Threat Paradigm

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Good morning Mister Chairman. I'd like to start by thanking you for your gracious comments about the DIA employees who were lost in the Pentagon and also, I should thank Senator Warner for reading their names and stories into the Congressional Record at the time of their memorial service. I also point out that eight members of Naval Intelligence who were members of the General Defense Intelligence Program federation also lost their lives in that attack.

What I would like to do to supplement the DCI's country by country comments is restrict myself to a few preliminary observations about how the events of September 11th, and their aftermath, are affecting the emerging global security environment, and our intelligence or threat paradigm.

For several years now, I and others have been talking about the Asymmetric Threat to the homeland. On September 11th that theory became reality. A strategic attack was carried out, **not** by the military forces of a rival state, but by a shadowy, global network of extremists and terrorists, who struck unprotected targets, using methods we did not anticipate. The attackers turned two of our strengths – a free, tolerant, and open society, and the world's best air transportation system – into deadly vulnerabilities. Their attack had human, economic, and psychological impacts of deep proportions. The terrorists were not deterred by our overwhelming military superiority ... in fact, for that day at least, they made it irrelevant. In the wake of that attack, traditional concepts of strategic threat, security, deterrence, warning and military superiority don't completely apply.

Perhaps the most critical dynamic following the terrorist attacks is how the rest of the world now perceives the United States. On one hand, September 11th exposed our vulnerabilities and demonstrated the strategic potential of a well-executed asymmetric attack ... facts that are extremely appealing to our foes. But rather than demoralizing us, the attack generated intense patriotism and resolve at home, sympathy and support abroad, and a greater willingness among the major powers to accept or accede to US leadership, at least temporarily. And the speed and efficiency with which we projected power to an austere theater of operations, deposed the Taliban, and continue to attack the Al Qaida network, are leaving a lasting impression.

Over the longer-term, the outcome of the war on terrorism will be decisive in determining international perceptions of the United States. Success will strengthen our role and leverage, and accentuate positive trends. Failure would invite a host of challenges.

In many respects, the Post Cold War period ended on 11 September. The next decade or so may well be defined by the struggle over globalization. Values and concepts long-championed by the United States and the West – political and economic openness, democracy and individual rights, market economics, international trade, scientific rationalism, and the rule of law – are being carried forward on the tide of globalization – money, people, information, technology, ideas, goods and services moving around the globe at higher speeds and with fewer restrictions.

Our adversaries increasingly understand this link. They equate globalization to Americanization and see the United States as the principal architect and primary beneficiary of an emerging order that undermines their values, interests, beliefs, and culture. They blame the United States for ‘what’s wrong’ in the world, and seek allies among states, groups, and individuals who worry about ‘US hegemony’ and are unhappy with the present or perceived future. They are adept at using globalization against us – exploiting the freer flow of money, people, and technology ... attacking the vulnerabilities presented by political and economic openness ... and using globalization’s ‘downsides’ to foster an extremist message, and attract recruits and support from among ‘globalization’s losers.’

In this context, the September terrorist attacks were the first strategic strikes in a war against our vision of the future world order. They targeted our homeland, but also struck a blow against global openness, the global transportation network, and the global economy. These extremists and their allies understand that their desired world cannot coexist with our brand of civilization. Encouraging, furthering and consolidating the positive aspects of globalization, while reducing and managing its downsides, and defeating its enemies, may well be the civilized world’s ‘measure of merit’ for the next decade.

Finally, even before September 11th, I expected the coming decade to be at least as turbulent as the 1990s, because the basic factors driving global change were still largely at play. Since then, my ‘expectation of uncertainty’ has only heightened. The global economic outlook is worse, there are likely to be more people in need, global defense and security issues are murkier, the Muslim world is under increased pressure, and key strategic relationships – between the United States, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan for instance – are more in flux. At the same time, longstanding regional disputes, especially in the Middle East and South Asia, have taken on added global importance.

In light of the above, I have accelerated my consideration of a new threat paradigm designed to capture the full range of challenges likely to confront our nation during the next decade or so. This emerging framework rests on several basic ideas: the likelihood of prolonged global uncertainty ... thoughts about how others are reacting to their perception of US dominance ... the notion of dangerous conditions arising from the convergence of negative global trends ... the strategic importance of the asymmetric threat ... and one element that hasn't changed since September 11th ... the continuing military threat posed by the strategic and regional forces of other nations.

Mister Chairman, I would like to leave you with the understanding that we are working diligently to improve our capacity to handle all of these intelligence challenges. But the path is not an easy one. The complex nature of the global environment, and the characteristics of many emerging threats – extremist, global, non-state, networked, adaptive – make them less vulnerable to traditional means. Ultimately, we must improve our capacity to deal with these asymmetric adversaries, even as we expand our understanding of more traditional military threats, and enhance our ability to support military operations on the conventional battlefield.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate yours and the Committee's continued support in ensuring that our intelligence capabilities remain the best in the world. Thank You.